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The purpose of the current research was to assess the impact of the age of an alibi corroborator 
on the perceptions and decision-making of alibi assessors.  Across two studies, adult participants 
were asked to assume the role of a police detective and to assess the alibi of an armed robbery 
suspect.  The alibi contained a single individual that was willing to verify the suspect’s account 
(i.e., an alibi corroborator).  In Study 1, I examined the impact of the alibi corroborator’s age 
(i.e., 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) and relationship with the suspect (i.e., stranger vs. neighbour vs. 
son) on ratings of five dependent measures related to corroborator credibility and suspect guilt.  
In Study 2, I examined the impact of the alibi corroborator’s age (i.e., 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old 
vs. 25-year-old) and the level of cognition needed to remember the alibi event (i.e., delayed vs. 
recent event) on the same five dependent measures.  Consistent with a two-factor model of 
witness credibility, results indicated that participants viewed an 8-year-old corroborator more 
favourably than a 4- or 25-year-old corroborator.  Participants also demonstrated increased 
skepticism when the corroborator was interviewed after a longer delay as well as when the 
corroborator was related to the suspect.  The current results help to shed light on an existing 
inconsistency in the alibi literature regarding the impact of corroborator age on alibi assessment 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
An alibi refers to an individual’s claim that he/she could not have been involved in a 
crime on the basis of having been somewhere other than the scene of the crime at the time of 
commission (Culhane & Hosch, 2012).  Police officers commonly encounter alibis at the outset 
of an investigation when potential suspects are questioned in order to ascertain the likelihood that 
they were involved in the offence (Dysart & Strange, 2012).  Officers must then assess the alibi 
and make decisions about which suspects to pursue and which to ignore – making the alibi 
assessment process a critical aspect of the investigation.  Troublingly though, the large amount of 
wrongful convictions in both Canada and the United States (Innocence Canada, 2018; Innocence 
Project, 2018) suggests that the alibi assessment process may often lead to inaccurate 
conclusions regarding the veracity of alibis. 
The alibi assessment process has important implications for investigative as well as 
adjudicative outcomes within the criminal justice system.  An analysis of the first 40 wrongful 
conviction cases (as determined by DNA evidence) revealed that there were eight cases (20%) 
where the perceived low quality, or absence, of an alibi was regarded as ‘incriminating evidence’ 
and contributed directly to the miscarriage of justice (Wells et al., 1998).  Elsewhere, researchers 
have suggested that the failure of alibis to yield sufficient protection for innocent alibi providers 
could be viewed as the leading contributing factor to wrongful convictions in the US, given that 
all DNA exonerees were convicted despite presumably providing some type of alibi (Dysart & 
Strange, 2012)1.  Researchers have found that alibi assessors consistently attribute low levels of 
                                                          
1 That all DNA exonerees had an alibi may be a slight overstatement.  As Garrett (2011) pointed 
out, some exonerees were genuinely without an alibi – they claimed they were at the scene of the 
crime but uninvolved in the offense.  Nevertheless, such cases constitute only marginal 
exceptions to the general trend noted by Dysart and Strange (2012). 
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believability to the alibis of suspects and accused persons (e.g., Dahl, Brimacombe, & Lindsay, 
2009; Olson & Wells, 2004), and that this level of skepticism can jeopardize innocent alibi 
providers (e.g., Wells et al., 1998).  Nevertheless, alibi assessment, unlike other psychological 
phenomena that contribute to wrongful conviction (e.g., eyewitness identification; see Cutler, 
2011) has yet to be examined sufficiently (Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson & Wells, 2004).   
1.1 The Alibi Assessment Process 
 The psychology of alibi assessment has been subjected to empirical examination only 
within the past decade or so.  In their seminal 2004 article, Olson and Wells developed a 
taxonomy with which to gauge the relative believability of an alibi.  The authors ranked the 
believability of an alibi as a function of two types of external corroborating evidence – (1) 
physical evidence and (2) person evidence.  Physical evidence refers to ‘hard’ evidence such as 
fingerprints, photographs, etc., while person evidence refers to ‘soft’ evidence such as an 
individual who offers sworn testimony on a suspect’s behalf.  The taxonomy contained three 
categories of physical evidence: (i) none, (ii) easy-to-fabricate (e.g., cash receipt), and (iii) 
difficult-to-fabricate (e.g., video footage).  The taxonomy also contained four categories of 
person evidence arranged according to familiarity with the suspect and motivation to lie: (i) 
none, (ii) motivated familiar other (e.g., a spouse), (ii) non-motivated stranger, and (iii) non-
motivated familiar other (e.g., an acquaintance).  Within this basic framework, the various 
categories of physical and person evidence form a continuum of alibi believability, such that the 
least believable alibi is one without any form of corroborating evidence, and the most believable 
alibi is one supported by a non-motivated familiar other and a form of difficult-to-fabricate 
physical evidence. 
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Subsequent research findings have been generally consistent with the abovementioned 
taxonomy.  Overall, alibi-assessors are more likely to believe an alibi and less likely to render 
guilty verdicts when strong corroborating evidence is forthcoming than when such evidence is 
lacking (e.g., Allison & Brimacombe, 2010; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Pozzulo, Pettalia, 
Dempsey, & Gooden, 2015).  Moreover, research has found that when physical evidence and 
person evidence are presented simultaneously, the impact of physical evidence largely 
overshadows the effect of person evidence (Olson & Wells, 2004).  In other words, physical 
evidence is more convincing than person evidence.  Both real-world cases and laboratory studies, 
however, have shown that people seldom produce physical evidence to support their alibis and 
instead tend to rely on the support of corroborating person evidence (e.g., Culhane et al., 2013; 
Olson & Charman, 2012).  In one study, Culhane and colleagues (2008) found that alibi 
providers overwhelmingly relied on person evidence (90%; the majority of which consisted of 
family members and friends) and could only produce supporting physical evidence in a minority 
of cases (30%).  More recently, Nieuwkamp, Horselenberg, and Van Koppen (2017) found that 
only 25% of innocent alibi providers reported having any form of physical evidence to support 
their alibis, while 90% reported at least one witness who could support their alibi.   
These laboratory findings are consistent with data obtained from real-world outcomes in 
Canada and the United States.  For example, Dysart and Strange (2012) found that a sample of 
law enforcement personnel indicated that suspects frequently offer motivated alibi witnesses to 
support their claims (i.e., family members, 40%, significant others, 34%, friends, 36%), whereas 
physical alibi evidence is offered in only a minority of criminal cases (24%).  Furthermore, in a 
recent examination of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases in the United States, it was revealed 
that approximately 86% of exonerees who raised an alibi defense at trial had alibi witnesses 
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(121/140; Garrett, 2011).  Clearly, the vast majority of alibis that undergo assessment are 
supported only by (motivated and familiar) person corroborators, and not by physical evidence.  
Therefore, in order to improve the alibi assessment process, it is necessary to develop a clearer 
understanding of those factors that affect perceptions of person evidence. 
1.2 The Suspect-Corroborator Relationship 
The relationship between the suspect and the alibi corroborator is an important factor that 
has been shown to have an impact on perceptions of the veracity of person evidence (e.g., Olson 
& Wells, 2004).  Hitherto, alibi researchers have revealed at least three major findings regarding 
the suspect-corroborator relationship that are in line with the aforementioned taxonomy.  First, 
researchers have consistently found that alibi assessors are more skeptical of corroborators who 
are related to the suspect than those who are not related (e.g., Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, & Shaw, 
2011).  In a mock-juror study, Lindsay, Lim, Marando, and Cully (1986) found that alibi 
corroboration from a stranger significantly reduced the rate of guilty votes (27%), but 
corroboration from a relative (i.e., brother-in-law) did not reduce the rate of guilty votes (57%).  
Similarly, Culhane and Hosch (2004) found that when the alibi corroborator was the defendant’s 
neighbour, conviction rates were significantly lower than when the corroborator was the 
defendant’s girlfriend (41% vs. 51%, respectively).  Consistent with these outcomes, Hosch et al. 
(2011) found that participants were more skeptical of an alibi when the corroborator was a 
biological relative as compared to an affinal relative, and were least skeptical of corroborators 
who were not related to the suspect.  In a more recent study, it was found that in order to offset 
the exonerating effects of a non-familial alibi corroborator, participants requested significantly 
more evidence than when the corroborator was related to the suspect (Bruer, Price, & Dahl, 
2016).   
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Researchers have found that the above pattern of skepticism may not be entirely 
unwarranted.  The second major finding regarding the suspect-corroborator relationship is that 
when asked what percentage of the time they would lie for a defendant, participants reported that 
they would be most willing to lie for a biological relative (42.02% of the time), less so for an 
affinal relative (32.72% of the time), and least willing if they were only socially related (19.03% 
of the time) (Hosch et al., 2011).  These participants also reported a greater willingness to lie for 
defendants with whom they shared a close social relationship than for those with a more distant 
relationship.  Lastly, moving beyond self-report data, Marion and Burke (2017) examined 
altruistic behaviour in an alibi context and found that alibi witnesses were more than twice as 
likely to corroborate a false alibi for a friend than for a stranger.  In sum, (1) people are more 
skeptical of corroborators who are related to the suspect (e.g., Hosch et al., 2011), (2) people 
report a greater willingness to lie for a relative than for a stranger (Hosch et al., 2011), and (3) 
people actually are more likely to corroborate a false alibi for a suspect with whom they have a 
close relationship (Marion & Burke, 2017). 
1.3 The Age of the Alibi Corroborator      
In addition to the suspect-corroborator relationship, the age of the alibi corroborator has 
been shown to influence perceptions of person evidence (e.g., Eastwood, Snook, & Au, 2016; 
Dahl & Price, 2012).  Unlike the effect of relationship, however, the directionality of the effect 
of corroborator age on alibi believability and suspect guilt has been notably inconsistent across 
studies.  For example, Dahl and Price (2012) used a mock-investigator paradigm to examine the 
impact of suspect-corroborator relationship (i.e., neighbour vs. son) and corroborator age (i.e., 6-
year-old vs. 25-year-old) on perceptions of alibi corroborators.  It was found that, irrespective of 
the relationship between the suspect and the alibi corroborator, child corroborators were 
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significantly more believable than were adults (see also Price & Dahl, 2014).  In contrast, 
Eastwood et al. (2016) used a policy-capturing methodology (i.e., a regression-based assessment 
of decision-making) to examine the impact of five dichotomously coded features on the alibi 
assessment process (i.e., suspect-corroborator relationship, corroborator age, amount of 
corroborators, corroborator confidence, and memorability of the event) and found that adult alibi 
corroborators were rated as more believable than child corroborators. 
There are at least three potential reasons for the discrepancy in results between these 
studies: (1) differences in the reported alibi event, (2) differences in the relationship between the 
alibi corroborator and the suspect, and (3) differences in the mode of presentation of the alibi 
corroborators.  On the first point, regarding the alibi event, Dahl and Price (2012) used a daylong 
interaction between the corroborator and the suspect, while Eastwood et al. used only a brief 
encounter.  Second, regarding the relationship variable, Dahl and Price used a son vs. neighbour 
paradigm whereas Eastwood et al. used a family member vs. stranger paradigm.  It is worth 
reiterating that a stranger (nonmotivated and unfamiliar) may be more likely to be met with 
greater skepticism than a neighbour (nonmotivated and familiar) (Olson & Wells, 2004).  Lastly, 
with regards to the differences in the mode of presentation of the alibi, Dahl and Price presented 
participants with audiovisual recordings of alibi statements, while Eastwood et al. presented 
written descriptions.  The lack of methodological parity across these studies limits our ability to 
draw clear conclusions about the effect of corroborator age.  Fortunately, the child witness 
literature offers a theoretical basis for untangling the existing discrepancy. 
1.4 The Two-Factor Model of Child Witness Credibility 
An abundance of research within the eyewitness and child victim literature has shown 
that laypeople and legal personnel generally believe that children, as compared to adults, are 
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inherently more honest (i.e., less likely to intentionally lie) but also are less cognitively 
competent (i.e., more likely to be unintentionally mistaken; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; 
Connolly, Price, & Gordon, 2010; Goodman, Golding, Hegelson, Haith, & Michelli, 1987; Ross, 
Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, 1990; Ross, Jurden, Lindsay, & Keeney, 2003).  The perception of 
child witness credibility as a function of these two distinct factors – honesty and cognitive ability 
– has been referred to as the two-factor model of child witness credibility (Ross et al., 2003).  
Similar expressions of this basic formula have been presented in earlier work as well.  Goodman, 
Bottoms, Herscovici, and Shaver (1989), for example, proposed that jurors’ perceptions of 
children’s credibility is largely influenced by two underlying ‘theories’ – (1) jurors may believe 
that children are honest and therefore believable, and (2) jurors may believe that children are less 
cognitively developed and therefore less believable (see also Ross et al., 1990).  Similarly, 
Haugaard and Reppucci (1992) highlighted the distinction between two important components – 
competency and credibility – where competency reflected children’s ability to understand the 
truth, and credibility consisted of children’s perceived honesty.  Each of these formulations 
converge on what will henceforth be referred to as the two-factor model.   
In two studies, Ross and colleagues (2003) examined whether mock-jurors’ perceptions 
of children’s credibility could be accounted for by the two-factor model and whether the two 
factors could predict verdict outcomes.  In study 1, mock-jurors were presented with a video 
recording of a child sexual abuse trial including testimony from the child (victim), father 
(accused), and an expert witness.  Participants then rendered a verdict and rated the child’s 
credibility on 14 items.  An exploratory, principle components analysis revealed that items 
loaded on two dimensions: honesty and cognitive ability.  The same procedure was carried out 
for study 2 but participants viewed only the child’s testimony.  Confirmatory factor analysis 
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replicated the model obtained in study 1.  Together, these studies provided empirical support for 
a two-factor model of child witness credibility.  Results indicated that honesty and cognitive 
ability were related but conceptually autonomous factors, and that honesty (but not cognitive 
ability) predicted verdict outcomes.  
Research on adults’ perceptions of the credibility of child witnesses has generated a 
mixture of results – sometimes children are perceived as more credible than adults (e.g., Ross, 
Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, 1990), sometimes less credible (e.g., Goodman et al., 1987; Leippe & 
Romanczyk, 1989, Study 2), and other times adults and children are perceived as equally 
credible (e.g., Bottoms, Diviak, & Davis, 1997).  The two-factor model affords us considerable 
insight into these inconsistencies.  In cases of child sexual abuse (CSA), younger children may 
be viewed as more credible as they are perceived as being honest but also sexually naïve (i.e., 
lacking the necessary cognitive ability to generate a false account of sexual abuse) (e.g., Bottoms 
& Goodman, 1994).  In non-CSA cases, however, young children may be viewed as less credible 
(e.g., Goodman et al., 1987).  Thus, as suggested by Goodman et al. (1989), perceptions of child 
witnesses may ultimately depend on which of the two factors – honesty or cognitive ability – is 
given greater consideration by jurors.  With regards to the relative importance of honesty and 
cognitive ability in adults’ assessments of children’s credibility, some research has shown that 
honesty may have greater predictive value than cognitive ability (Ross et al., 2003; Talwar, Lee, 
Bala, Lindsay, 2006), while other findings appear to demonstrate that cognitive ability may be 
more important than honesty (Price & Dahl, 2017).  Discrepancies in the inherent importance of 
honesty versus cognitive ability notwithstanding, the two-factor model provides a useful and 
empirically supported conceptualization of perceptions of child witness credibility.   
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The two-factor model offers a reasonable account of the inconsistent effects of 
corroborator age reported by Dahl and Price (2012) and Eastwood et al. (2016).  First, Dahl and 
Price (2012) presented a scenario in which the suspect spent the entire day with either their son 
or their neighbour.  This situation casts very little doubt on the accuracy/ cognitive ability of the 
corroborator and instead may have primed participants to consider corroborator honesty (as the 
authors pointed out), increasing the believability of the child corroborator.  Conversely, 
Eastwood et al. (2016) presented a scenario in which the suspect only briefly encountered either 
a family member or a stranger.  This situation casts considerably more doubt on the accuracy of 
the corroborator and may have deemphasized considerations of honesty, increasing the 
believability of the adult corroborator overall.   
1.5 Perceptions of Children in an Alibi Context  
 Over the past several decades, a great deal of research has been conducted on adults’ 
perceptions of child witnesses (reviewed above).  There are, however, some important 
differences between alibi witnesses and witnesses to crime.  First, children who witness a crime 
may or may not be related to, or even familiar with, the criminal suspect.  While research has 
shown that, in reality, defendants are often familiar to the victim (Flowe, Mehta, & Ebbeson, 
2011), the majority of eyewitness research has been conducted using stranger-perpetrators 
(Pozzulo, 2017).  Research with stranger-perpetrators, however, may only be relevant to a 
minority of alibi corroborators.  That is, the overwhelming majority of alibi corroborators are 
related to, or at least familiar with, the criminal suspect (the alibi provider) (e.g., Culhane et al., 
2008).  The existence of a close relationship between the corroborator and the suspect is of 
particular relevance for child corroborators given their lack of independence and their need for 
supervision.   
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In addition to the suspect-corroborator relationship, another major difference between 
criminal and alibi contexts is the directionality of the effects of witness credibility on perceptions 
of suspect culpability.  Eyewitnesses to crime, if believed, produce an inculpatory effect, 
whereas alibi witnesses are inherently exculpatory (at least to some extent).  A form of ‘tunnel 
vision’, however, can lead investigators to focus on and more readily accept inculpatory 
evidence as compared to exculpatory evidence (see, for e.g., Findley & Scott, 2006).  Thus, an 
asymmetry may exist in the evidentiary weight of exculpatory alibi evidence versus inculpatory 
eyewitness evidence.  Similarly, Dahl, Brimacombe, and Lindsay (2009) found that alibi 
providers were generally rated as less credible than were eyewitnesses.  Finally, as others have 
noted (e.g., Charman, Reyes, Villalba, & Evans, 2017; Price & Dahl, 2017), there is a 
considerable difference in the underlying salience of an alibi event compared to a criminal 
offence.  Alibis often consist of ordinary events, lacking the emotional, moral, and motivational 
dimensions of crime.  Alibi witnesses are unlikely to be aware that they may later be asked to 
recount the alibi event, whereas those who witness a crime may be more apt to intentionally 
encode the event as it unfolds.  Therefore, witnesses to crime may be more likely to have an 
accessible memory trace for the criminal event than an alibi witness would have for an alibi 
event. 
1.6 Overview of the Present Research 
 As mentioned, the assessment of alibis can impact decision-making at various stages of 
the criminal justice process – from the investigation through to adjudication.  Given that alibi 
assessment outcomes differ according to the assessment context (Sommers & Douglas, 2007), it 
is important to note the context of the current research.  In line with a great deal of existing alibi 
research (e.g., Eastwood et al., 2016; Dahl & Price, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004; Price & Dahl, 
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2017), the current work was conducted using a mock-investigator paradigm.  That is, all 
participants were instructed to take on the role of a police detective investigating an armed 
robbery case.  This approach contrasts a mock-juror paradigm – also commonly used in the alibi 
literature (e.g., Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Hosch et al., 2011).  One reason for the present focus on 
the investigative context is that, in reality, far more cases require investigation than proceed to 
jury trial.  Therefore, alibi assessment is often (though not always) a process that begins and ends 
during the investigative phase of the criminal process.  Secondly, any inaccurate conclusions 
reached about alibis during the investigation may produce undesirable downstream effects.  For 
example, Sommers and Douglas (2007) found that mock-jurors were more skeptical of alibis 
than were mock-investigators and suggested that this effect may have been due to mock-jurors’ 
belief that an alibi must not be compelling if the case made it to trial.  Given the ubiquity of alibi 
assessment during criminal investigations and the ‘cascading effects’ it may produce (Crozier, 
Strange, & Loftus, 2017), the present research focused on the investigative context.   
Across two studies, I attempted to clarify the aforementioned discrepancy regarding the 
impact of corroborator age by expanding upon existing research on perceptions of alibi 
corroborators.  To reiterate, both studies used a mock-investigator paradigm where participants 
were asked to assume the role of a police detective and to examine the details of a mock crime 
and a description of a suspect’s alibi.  In Study 1, participants were presented with a description 
of either an 8-year-old or a 25-year-old alibi corroborator who was described as either the 
suspect's son, neighbour, or a stranger.  In Study 2, the level of cognition needed to remember 
the alibi event was manipulated (by varying the delay between the time of the crime and the time 
of questioning) along with the age of the alibi corroborator (i.e., 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-
year-old).  In both studies, participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt were 
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assessed along with perceptions of believability, likelihood of corroborator mistakenness, 
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Chapter 2: Study 1 
Due to the relative dearth of research in this area, Study 1 was aimed at exploring the 
impact of age under more neutral conditions (i.e., conditions that do not emphasize honesty or 
accuracy) and with a more exhaustive manipulation of the suspect-corroborator relationship than 
has been used in some of the previous research (i.e., three levels instead of two).  As mentioned, 
an important consideration for the current line of inquiry was the nature of the reported alibi 
event.  The alibi event presented in Study 1 deviates from that which was presented by Dahl and 
Price (2012) (i.e., a daylong interaction between the suspect and the corroborator) and by 
Eastwood et al. (2016) (i.e., a brief encounter between the suspect and corroborator that varied 
on five dimensions).  My aim was to minimize the extent to which the alibi event, in itself, 
would influence participants’ perceptions.  Thus, the event presented in the current study – the 
alibi corroborator sees the suspect in the park while playing baseball – was intended to have a 
level of plausibility that was not dependent upon the age of the corroborator.  Also, and 
importantly, the alibi event was intended to be relatively neutral insofar as it would not lead 
inherently to an asymmetry in participants’ considerations of corroborator honesty versus 
corroborator accuracy. 
The examination of relationship and corroborator age in Study 1 served as a replication 
and extension of previous research.  Given that Eastwood et al. (2016) and Dahl and Price (2012) 
examined age and relationship but uncovered contradictory effects, these variables were used in 
the current study so that this inconsistency might be more clearly understood.  More specifically, 
I chose to treat the suspect-corroborator relationship as a trichotomy (son vs. neighbour vs. 
stranger), whereas Dahl and Price (2012) and Eastwood et al. (2016) treated it as a dichotomous 
variable (son vs. neighbour; family member vs. stranger, respectively).  Thus, while expanding 
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on that of the most relevant research, the relationship variable in the present work was also in 
keeping with the conceptualization of suspect-corroborator relationship as put forth by Olson and 
Wells (2004) in the taxonomy research reviewed above (i.e., the son is considered motivated and 
familiar, neighbour is nonmotivated and familiar, and stranger is nonmotivated and unfamiliar).   
The existing alibi literature offered considerably less guidance on the manipulation of 
corroborator age.  As mentioned, Dahl and Price (2012) and Price and Dahl (2014) used 6- 
versus 25-year-old corroborator conditions whereas Eastwood et al. (2016) used various 
exemplars for both child corroborator (5-, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old) and adult corroborator (22-, 24-
, 25-, 27-year-old) conditions.  Price and Dahl (2017) also examined various ages including 6- 8- 
11- and 25-year-old conditions.  Beyond these few alibi studies, 8-year-old ‘child’ conditions 
have been commonly been used in previous research examining laypersons’ and legal 
professionals’ perceptions of eyewitnesses (e.g., Nigro, Buckley, Hill & Nelson, 1989; Ross et 
al., 1990; Wells, Turtle, Luus, 1989) as have 25-year-old ‘adult’ conditions (e.g., Nigro et al., 
1989).  Thus, 8- and 25-year-old conditions were used in the present study in order to remain 
generally consistent with the age ranges used in much of the existing child witness and alibi 
research.  
Based on previous findings regarding the suspect-corroborator relationship (e.g., Culhane 
& Hosch, 2004; Hosch et al., 2011; Olson & Wells, 2004), it was hypothesized that there would 
be a significant effect of relationship such that when the alibi corroborator was described as the 
suspect’s son, participants would rate the corroborator as significantly less believable than when 
described as a stranger or a neighbour.  Although previous research has generated mixed findings 
regarding corroborator age, multiple studies support the view that child corroborators may be 
viewed as more honest (Dahl & Price, 2017) and more compelling than adults (e.g., Dahl & 
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Price, 2012; Price & Dahl, 2014) whereas only one study has suggested that adults are more 
believable (Eastwood et al., 2016).  Thus, it was hypothesized that there would be a significant 
main effect of corroborator age such that child corroborators would be viewed as more 
believable than adult corroborators.  No specific hypothesis was formulated regarding an 
interaction effect.   
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants  
The undergraduate student sample consisted of 182 undergraduate students at the 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology (65 males, 116 females, 1 other; M age = 19.35 
years, SD = 2.56, Range = 17-38).  Sixty-six participants self-identified2 as Asian (36.30%), 59 
participants self-identified as White (32.40%), 47 participants self-identified as Other (25.80%), 
28 participants self-identified as Black (15.40%), and one participant self-identified as 
Aboriginal (0.50%).  The majority of participants (n = 156) reported being in their first year of 
study. 
The community sample consisted of 195 general community members from the US (72 
males, 122 females, 1 other; M age = 41.92 years, SD = 13.86, Range = 19-78)3. One hundred 
and fifty-two participants self-identified as White (77.9%), 16 participants self-identified as 
Black African (8.2%), 6 participants self-identified as Other (3.1%), 6 participants self-identified 
as Asian (3.1%), 5 participants self-identified as Aboriginal (2.6%), 5 participants self-identified 
as Latin American (2.6%), 4 participants self-identified as Southeast Asian (2.1%), 3 participants 
                                                          
2 Participants could self-identify as more than one ethnicity. 
3 These age statistics do not include one participant who reported his/her age as “3”. 
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self-identified as South Asian (1.5%), 3 participants self-identified as Black Caribbean (1.5%), 2 
participants self-identified as Arab (1.0%).  
Student and community samples were collapsed together for the present analyses.  This 
decision was based on the weight of evidence regarding the legal decision-making of student vs. 
non-student samples.  Eastwood et al. (2016) found that the overall pattern of alibi-related 
decision-making was similar across undergraduate students, law enforcement students, and law 
enforcement officers – an observation that is consistent with findings from the juror decision-
making literature.  A qualitative review of 26 experiments directly comparing student and non-
student mock-jurors revealed that a main effect of juror-sample was found in only five of the 26 
studies (Bornstein, 1999).  Of note, all non-student samples included by Bornstein (1999) were 
older, on the average, than the student samples and were more demographically heterogeneous.  
More recently, Bornstein et al. (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of 53 studies and found that 
guilty verdicts, culpability ratings, and damage awards did not differ significantly across student- 
and non-student mock-jurors.  Thus, the preponderance of evidence clearly indicates that student 
and non-student mock-jurors do not differ consistently in their decision-making.  While the 
current study used a mock-investigator rather than mock-juror paradigm, the overwhelming 
similarity in the legally relevant decision-making of students and non-students across a wide 
range of trial types and treatment variables provided sufficient justification for combining 
students and non-students for the present analysis. 
Along with standard Qualtrics protocol (i.e., participants who completed the survey in 
less than one-third the median completion time were automatically dropped from the study), any 
participants that did not complete all questions successfully were removed prior to analysis (see 
Appendix C).  Thirty-four participants were removed in this process.  The total sample used for 
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data analysis consisted of 343 adult participants.  A power analysis4 indicated that the current 
sample was sufficient to achieve statistical power > .80. 
2.1.2 Materials and Design 
 Study 1 used a 2 (Corroborator Age: 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) × 3 (Suspect-
Corroborator Relationship: Stranger vs. Neighbour vs. Son) between-subjects design.  An online 
survey was created using Qualtrics survey software.  The first page of the survey presented 
participants with an informed consent page that provided information about the study and contact 
information for the researchers.  The second page of the survey consisted of a series of 
demographic questions (e.g., age and gender).  The third page instructed participants to assume 
the role of a police detective investigating an armed robbery case.  Participants were presented 
with a brief description of the case: a local convenience store was robbed by a man wearing a ski 
mask, and based on eyewitness reports of the make and model of the perpetrator’s car and a 
physical description of the perpetrator, police have identified a potential suspect.  The potential 
suspect denied involvement in the crime, and claimed to be walking his dog at a park near his 
home (located across town from the convenience store) at the time that the robbery took place.  
At this point, participants were instructed to rate the likelihood that the suspect was guilty on a 
10-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely).  
On the next page, participants were informed that police had identified an individual who 
could verify the suspect’s account.  Participants were assigned randomly to one of six alibi 
                                                          
4 A minimum sample size of 301 was determined from a power analysis conducted using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  While Dahl and Price (2012) reported a 
medium effect size for corroborator age, the effect size of relationship seems to be somewhat 
smaller (e.g., Olson & Wells, 2004).  Therefore, a Cohens f of .18 (as reported by Olson & 
Wells, 2004) was used to generate a more conservative estimate of minimum sample size.  Alpha 
was set at .05 and power at .80 (as advised by Cohen, 1988). 
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corroborator conditions (i.e., participants were presented with information from a corroborator 
who was described as either an 8-year-old or a 25-year-old, and who was either the suspect’s 
son, neighbour, or a stranger).  In each condition, the corroborator claimed to have been playing 
baseball in the park when he saw the suspect walking his dog at the time in question.  
Participants were instructed to rate the following on 10-point Likert scales: the likelihood that the 
suspect is guilty (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely), the believability of the alibi 
corroborator (1 = Extremely Unbelievable to 10 = Extremely Believable), the likelihood that the 
alibi corroborator is mistaken about seeing the suspect (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely 
Likely), the likelihood that the alibi corroborator is being honest about seeing the suspect (1 = 
Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely), and the overall credibility of the alibi corroborator 
(1 = Extremely Uncredible to 10 = Extremely Credible).  Participants were also asked to 
describe, in as much detail as possible, the reasoning for their ratings.  The final page of the 
survey informed participants that they have concluded the study, and thanked them for their 
participation.    
2.1.3 Procedure 
Undergraduate Sample.  Undergraduate students who were enrolled in either an 
introductory or an abnormal psychology class registered to participate in the study through an 
online, research registration system.  Upon arrival at the psychology laboratory, each participant 
was greeted and shown to a private cubicle containing a desktop computer.  Prior to beginning 
the online survey, participants were provided with verbal instructions on how to complete the 
study.  Participants were presented with a page containing the consent form and were informed 
that by advancing beyond that page, consent was implied.  The survey automatically assigned 
participants randomly to one of the six conditions.  Upon completion of the survey, participants 
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were presented with a debriefing page.  When participants were finished the study, they were 
thanked for their participation and each student was awarded 0.5% bonus in his/her psychology 
course.  The study took approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
Community Sample.  Community members were recruited using the Qualtrics online 
panels service. Potential participants were sent the URL link for the study via email.  Participants 
accessed the survey and worked through each of the pages of the online survey (completed 
remotely). The survey automatically assigned participants randomly to one of the six conditions.  
Participants were compensated from Qualtrics for completing the survey. 
2.1.4 Coding Open-Ended Responses 
 Each participant provided the reasoning for his/her ratings in an open-ended response.  
Through an iterative process, a coding guide was constructed by the first author, who then coded 
all responses.  Eight components were coded as present (1) or absent (0): whether the participant 
mentioned (1) the corroborator’s age (Age), (2) the suspect-corroborator relationship 
(Relationship), (3) that the corroborator might have been distracted (Distraction), (4) that more 
information or evidence was necessary (More Information), (5) that the corroborator might be 
deceitful (Lying), (6) that the corroborator might be unintentionally mistaken (Memory Error), 
(7) that the corroborator may have been susceptible to external influence (Susceptibility to 
Influence), (8) that the corroborator could have acted as an accomplice (Accomplice).  
2.1.5 Inter-Rater Reliability 
A research assistant also coded each participant’s open-ended response using the same 
coding guide.  The reliability of the coding was assessed using Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) and 
percentage agreement (n = 324).  The Kappa and percentage agreement (in parentheses) were as 
follows: Age = 0.91 (96%), Relationship = 0.89 (94%), Distraction = 0.86 (98%), More 
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Information = 0.65 (91%), Lying = 0.49 (82%), Memory Error = 0.62 (89%), Susceptibility to 
Influence = 0.80 (97%), and Accomplice = 0.45 (93%).  The average Kappa across all responses 
was 0.71 (93%), indicating substantial agreement between coders (Landis & Koch, 1977).   
2.2 Results 
Pre-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
 Immediately after viewing the crime scenario vignette, participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood of the suspect’s guilt (on a 10-point Likert scale).  Though all participants had been 
presented with identical information up to this point, in order to ensure that there were no group 
differences based on condition, a 2 (Age: Child vs. Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour 
vs. Stranger) between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on participants’ 
ratings of the likelihood that the suspect was guilty.  The main effect of Age was not significant, 
F(1, 337) = 0.15, p = .698, ηp2 = .000, nor was the main effect of Relationship, F(2, 337) = 0.29, 
p = .752, ηp2 = .002.  The Age × Relationship interaction was also not significant, F(2, 337) = 
1.70, p = .185, ηp2 = .01. 
Pre-Alibi vs Post-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
 A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare participants’ pre-alibi and post-
alibi ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt.  There was a significant difference between 
pre-alibi and post-alibi guilt ratings, F(1, 342) = 127.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .27.  Twenty seven 
percent of the variance in guilt ratings could be accounted for by whether the suspect’s guilt was 
rated before or after viewing the alibi.  Participants’ ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s 
guilt were significantly higher before viewing the alibi (M = 5.82, SD = 2.09) than they were 
after viewing the alibi (M = 4.77, SD = 2.14).    
Post-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
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 A 2 (Age: Child vs Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger) between 
subjects ANCOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt 
(with pre-alibi guilt ratings as a covariate).  There was no significant main effect of Age, F(1, 
336) = 0.07, p = .792, ηp2 = .000, nor was there a significant Age × Relationship interaction, F(2, 
336) = 0.78, p = .461, ηp2 = .01.  There was, however, a significant main effect of Relationship, 
F(2, 336) = 5.28, p = .006, ηp2 = .03.  Three percent of the variance in ratings of suspect guilt 
could be accounted for by the relationship between the suspect and the alibi corroborator.  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that when the alibi corroborator was described as the suspect’s 
son, participants rated the suspect as more likely to be guilty (M = 5.18, SD = 2.05) than when 
the corroborator was described as a stranger (M = 4.71, SD = 2.17, d = 0.22) or neighbour (M = 
4.45, SD = 2.15, d = 0.35), ps < .05.  Guilt ratings did not differ significantly between Neighbour 
and Stranger conditions (p = .559).  
Alibi Corroborator Believability 
 A 2 (Age: Child vs. Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of alibi corroborator believability.  
There was not a significant main effect of Age, F(1, 337) = 0.01, p = .923, ηp2 = .000, nor was 
there a significant Age × Relationship interaction, F(2, 337) = 0.09, p = .915, ηp2 = .001.  There 
was, however, a significant main effect of Relationship, F(2, 337) = 8.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .05.  
Five percent of the variance in corroborator believability ratings could be accounted for by the 
relationship between the suspect and the alibi corroborator.  Post-hoc tests (with a Bonferroni 
correction) revealed that when the corroborator was described as the suspect’s son, corroborator 
believability ratings were significantly lower (M = 5.59, SD = 2.07) than when described as the 
suspect’s neighbour (M = 6.42, SD = 1.71, d = 0.44, p = .002) or a stranger (M = 6.48, SD = 1.79, 
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d = 0.46, p = .001).  Believability ratings did not differ significantly across Neighbour and 
Stranger corroborator conditions (p = 1.00).     
Ratings of the Likelihood of Corroborator Being Mistaken  
A 2 (Age: Child vs. Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the alibi 
corroborator was mistaken about seeing the suspect.  There was not a significant main effect of 
Age, F(1, 337) = 0.85, p = .356, ηp2 = .003, nor was there a main effect of Relationship, F(2, 
337) = 2.28, p = .104, ηp2 = .01.  There was, however, a significant Age × Relationship 
interaction, F(2, 337) = 4.07, p = .018, ηp2 = .02.  Two percent of the variance in ratings of alibi 
corroborator mistakenness could be accounted for by the interaction between the age of the alibi 
corroborator and the suspect-corroborator relationship.  Follow-up tests (with a Bonferroni 
correction) indicated that within the Child corroborator condition, when described as the 
suspect’s son, participants rated the corroborator as significantly less likely to be mistaken (M = 
4.74, SD = 2.17) than when described as a stranger (M = 6.02, SD = 1.71, d = .66, p = .003), but 
not significantly different from when described as the suspect’s neighbour (M = 5.53, SD = 2.02, 
p = .121). 
Ratings of the Likelihood of Corroborator Honesty 
 A 2 (Age: Child vs. Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the alibi 
corroborator was being honest about seeing the suspect.  The main effect of Age was not 
significant, F(1, 337) = 3.70, p = .055, ηp2 = .01, nor was the Age × Relationship interaction, F(2, 
337) = 0.09, p = .914, ηp2 = .001.  There was, however, a main effect of Relationship, F(2, 337) = 
18.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .10.  Ten percent of the variance in ratings of corroborator honesty could 
CORROBORATOR AGE AND ALIBI ASSESSMENT 23 
 
 
be accounted for by the relationship between the suspect and the alibi corroborator.  Post-hoc 
tests (with a Bonferroni correction) indicated that participants’ ratings of corroborator honesty 
were significantly lower when the corroborator was described as the suspect’s son (M = 5.54, SD 
= 2.11) than when described as the suspect’s neighbour (M = 6.90, SD = 1.86, d = 0.68) or a 
stranger (M = 6.96, SD = 1.95, d = 0.70), ps < .001).  Honesty ratings did not differ significantly 
across neighbour and stranger corroborator conditions (p = 1.00). 
Ratings of the Overall Credibility of the Alibi Corroborator 
  A 2 (Age: Child vs. Adult) × 3 (Relationship: Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the overall credibility of the alibi 
corroborator.  There was no significant main effect of Age, F(1, 337) = 0.18, p = .674, ηp2 = 
.001, nor was there a significant Age × Relationship interaction, F(2, 337) = 0.03, p = .973, ηp2 = 
.000.  There was, however, a significant main effect of Relationship, F(2, 337) = 12.86, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .07.  Seven percent of the variance in participants’ ratings of the overall credibility of the 
alibi corroborator could be accounted for by the relationship between the suspect and the 
corroborator.  Post-hoc tests (with a Bonferroni correction) indicated that participants rated the 
alibi corroborator as significantly less credible overall when the corroborator was described as 
the suspect’s son (M = 5.26, SD = 2.18) than when described as the suspect’s neighbour (M = 
6.35, SD = 1.70, d = .56) or a stranger (M = 6.44, SD = 1.89, d = .58), ps < .001.  Credibility 
ratings did not differ significantly across neighbour and stranger corroborator conditions (p = 
1.00).  
Open-Ended Responses 
One hundred and forty-eight participants (43.1%) mentioned the suspect-corroborator 
relationship, 123 participants (35.9%) mentioned the age of the alibi corroborator, 78 (22.7%) 
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mentioned that the corroborator may be motivated to lie for the suspect, 57 (16.6%) mentioned 
that the corroborator might be unintentionally mistaken, 50 (14.6%) mentioned that they needed 
more information to make their decisions, 30 (8.7%) mentioned that the corroborator may have 
been influenced, 29 (8.5%) mentioned that the corroborator may have been distracted at the time 
of the alibi event, and 12 (3.5%) mentioned that the corroborator may have also been involved in 
the offence (i.e., may have been an accomplice).  Note that these were open-ended responses and 
so participants were free to mention more than one of these factors. Open-ended responses were 
not analyzed further. 
Results Summary 
 In Study 1, participants rated the suspect’s son (as compared to a neighbour or stranger) 
as significantly less believable, less honest, and less credible overall. Ratings of the neighbour 
and stranger did not differ on any of the dependent measures.  There were no significant main 
effects of corroborator age on any of the dependent measures. Lastly, there were no significant 
interaction effects on any of the dependent measures (with one exception – within the child 
corroborator condition, participants rated the son as less likely to be mistaken than a stranger) 
2.3 Discussion 
 In the present study, I examined the extent to which alibi assessment outcomes differed 
as a function of the age of an alibi corroborator (8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) and the suspect-
corroborator relationship (Son vs. Neighbour vs. Stranger).  In an effort to reconcile the 
contradictory findings of past research regarding the effects of corroborator age, I attempted to 
establish a relatively neutral alibi event (i.e., while playing baseball at a local park, the 
corroborator sees the suspect).  That is, an event that did not last for an entire day (e.g., Dahl & 
Price, 2012), did not contain multiple other embedded variables (e.g., Eastwood et al., 2016), and 
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did not depend entirely on the age of the corroborator (i.e., a child or an adult playing baseball in 
a park are both plausible scenarios). 
 The current findings fit with past research regarding the impact of a corroborator’s 
relationship with a suspect (e.g., Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Hosch et al., 2011).  As hypothesized, 
participants in the current study rated the suspect’s son as less believable, less honest, and less 
credible than the suspect’s neighbour or a stranger.  Clearly, participants demonstrated a higher 
level of skepticism toward the close-relationship corroborator (though the effect was not large).  
It is worth noting that such skepticism is not without basis.  As reviewed earlier, close 
relationships appear to increase the likelihood that a corroborator will support a false alibi 
(Marion & Burke, 2017).  Indeed, participants’ skepticism toward the suspect’s son was reflected 
in the (arguably more consequential) rating of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt.  When the 
corroborator was described as the suspect’s son, the suspect was rated as more likely to be guilty 
than when the corroborator was described as the suspect’s neighbour or a stranger.   
In contrast to Eastwood et al. (2016) and Dahl and Price (2012), and contrary to my 
hypothesis, no main effects of age were found in the current study.  It is worth mentioning, 
however, that there was a small effect of corroborator age on honesty ratings (p = .055, ηp2 = 
.01).  Specifically, participants rated the 8-year-old corroborator as slightly more likely to be 
honest than the 25-year-old corroborator (but again, the observed effect was quite small and not 
statistically significant).  Price and Dahl (2017) found that child corroborators were rated as 
more honest than adults but that this difference was not reflected in ratings of the suspect’s guilt.  
Thus, while the 8-year-old corroborator in the current study may have been perceived as slightly 
more honest than the 25-year-old, this difference was not nearly strong enough to produce any 
significant differences in ratings of overall credibility or suspect guilt across age conditions.  
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However, differences in perceptions of credibility may be observed when younger children are 
assessed (e.g., preschoolers).  To explore this possibility, a 4-year-old condition was included in 
Study 2. 
It is important to point out that the vignettes provided only a fragmentary snapshot of the 
totality of the investigation (i.e., only brief descriptions of the crime and the suspect’s alibi). 
Therefore, participants may have rated the suspect’s guilt only tentatively and with the 
foreknowledge that said rating could be revised as the hypothetical investigation unfolds.  
Indeed, many participants commented on the need for additional information to make more 
informed decisions (e.g., “It is difficult whether or not to make any decision certain with these 
statements. What one states in written form is only a fraction of the whole picture”) and many 
expressed a desire to continue with the investigation (e.g., “We live in a country where you're 
innocent until proven guilty. I would continue the investigation but wouldn't jump to a 
conclusion that the witness was lying”).  A forced-choice investigative decision question was 
included in Study 2 in order to determine whether participants would choose to continue to 
pursue the individual as their primary suspect or begin to search for other potential suspects.  
While only a minority of participants mentioned the corroborator’s age (35.9 %) and 
relationship with the suspect (43.1 %) in their open-ended responses, the significant effects of 
relationship on the dependent measures suggests that participants were using this information to 
inform their assessments.  This suggests that, in general, participants were paying attention to the 
manipulation of suspect-corroborator relationship.  However, it is not known whether 
participants were paying sufficient attention to the manipulation of corroborator age.  More 
direct manipulation checks were included in Study 2.   
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Chapter 3: Study 2 
As with Study 1, the purpose of Study 2 was to continue to explore the effects of 
corroborator age on alibi assessment.  Specifically, a 4-year-old age condition was introduced, 
the baseball aspect of the alibi event was dropped, an investigative decision question was added, 
and more direct manipulation checks were used.  In an alibi assessment context, researchers have 
previously examined corroborator ages as young as 6-years-old (e.g., Price & Dahl, 2017).  
Developmental research has found that genuine differences exist in the autobiographical memory 
ability of preschoolers versus that of older children (e.g., Nelson & Fivush, 2004).  For example, 
younger children tend to report less information than do older children (e.g., Ornstein, Gordon, 
& Larus, 1992).  These differences notwithstanding, Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, 
and Mitchell (2003) found that children as young as 4-years-old are capable of providing 
substantial, forensically relevant information in response to free-recall prompts.  As previously 
mentioned, adults’ perceptions of the memory abilities of children often differ for younger versus 
older children, but these differences are not always consistent.  Therefore, I chose to include a 4-
year-old corroborator condition in the current study to compare against the older child (8-year-
old) and adult (25-year-old) conditions. 
The alibi event used in Study 1 consisted of an alibi corroborator playing baseball in a 
park and seeing the suspect.  However, 8.5% of participants expressed some level of concern 
about the possibility that the corroborator could have been distracted (e.g., “…he was already 
preoccupied playing baseball”).  Therefore, the baseball component was dropped for Study 2, 
and instead, the alibi event consisted of the alibi corroborator and the suspect walking their dog 
together in the park.  The suspect-corroborator relationship was held constant (i.e., father and 
son) across all conditions in Study 2, since in reality most corroborators consist of people who 
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are close with the suspect (e.g., family and friends) (e.g., Culhane et al., 2008) and this is likely 
to be particularly relevant for child corroborators due to their need for supervision.  In keeping 
with the two-factor model mentioned previously, in Study 2, I chose to manipulate the cognitive 
difficulty associated with remembering the alibi event.  In theory, events that are relatively 
difficult to remember should be more problematic for children than for adults due to their 
underdeveloped cognitive ability.  
As mentioned, many participants expressed a need for additional information in order to 
make their decisions and some participants pointed out that they would opt to investigate further 
before arriving at any conclusions.  In reality, an investigator’s decision regarding the 
continuation of an investigation is not one that is likely to be represented appropriately by a 
series of Likert scales.  Thus, in Study 2 I included a binary investigative decision question in 
order to determine whether participants would choose to continue to pursue the individual as 
their primary suspect or begin to search for other potential suspects.  Similar investigative 
decision-making questions have been used in previous research as well (Dahl & Price, 2012; 
Price & Dahl, 2017).  Lastly, to ensure that participants were paying attention to the 
manipulations, more direct manipulation checks were included at the end of Study 2. 
I hypothesized that participants would rate the alibi corroborator as more credible when 
the alibi event was ‘easy to remember’ (i.e., recent) than when the event was ‘difficult to 
remember’ (i.e., delayed).  In keeping with the aforementioned two-factor model, it was 
hypothesized that when the level of cognition required to remember the alibi event is perceived 
to be relatively high, adult corroborators will be significantly more believable than children.  On 
the other hand, it is expected that when the perceived level of cognition needed to remember the 
event is comparably lower (i.e., when the event is seen as relatively easy to remember), child 
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corroborators will be rated as more believable.  Given the lack of age effects in Study 1, no 
specific hypotheses were formulated with regards to the main effect of the age of the alibi 
corroborator.    
3.1. Method 
3.1.1Participants  
The total sample consisted of 236 students from the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology (103 males, 133 females; Mage = 20.11 years, SD = 3.48, Range = 17–51).  Eighty-
two participants self-identified as White (34.7%), 65 participants self-identified as South Asian 
(27.5%), 30 participants self-identified as Black (12.7%), 17 participants self-identified as Other 
(7.2%), 14 participants self-identified as Arab (5.9%), 12 participants self-identified as Filipino 
(5.1%), 12 participants self-identified as Chinese (5.1%), 7 participants self-identified as 
Southeast Asian (3.0%), 5 participants self-identified as West Asian (2.1%), 4 participants self-
identified as Korean (1.7%), 3 participants self-identified as Latin American (1.3%), 1 
participant self-identified as Japanese (0.4%).  Ninety-five participants (40.3%) were in their first 
year of study.  A power analysis5 indicated that the current sample was sufficient to achieve 
statistical power > .80. 
Those participants who did not correctly report the alibi event, corroborator age, and 
delay at the end of the survey were removed prior to analysis.  Fifty-seven participants were 
removed in this process.  Data from an additional 45 participants could not be used in the 
analysis due to a survey error.  The total sample used for data analysis consisted of 134 adult 
participants (62 males, 72 females; M age = 20.41 years, SD = 4.24, Range = 17–51).  
                                                          
5 A minimum sample size of 157 was determined from a power analysis conducted using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007).  Due to the novelty of the present study, a medium effect size was 
assumed.  Alpha was set at .05 and power at .80 (as advised by Cohen, 1988). 
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3.1.2 Materials and Design 
 Study 2 used a 2 (level of cognition: easy-to-remember vs. difficult-to-remember) × 3 
(age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) between-subjects design.  An online survey was 
created using Qualtrics survey software.  The first page of the survey presented participants with 
an informed consent form that contained information about the study and contact information for 
the researchers.  The second page consisted of a series of demographic questions (e.g., age and 
gender).  The third page instructed participants to assume the role of a police detective 
investigating an armed robbery case.  Participants were presented with a brief description of the 
case: a local convenience store was robbed by a man wearing a ski mask, and based on 
eyewitness reports of the make and model of the perpetrator’s car and a physical description of 
the perpetrator, police have identified a potential suspect.  In order to manipulate the level of 
cognition needed to remember the alibi event, the delay between the time of the crime and the 
time of questioning was varied such that the crime was described as having taken place at either: 
“7:00 pm yesterday evening” (easy-to-remember) or at “7:00 pm one month ago” (difficult-to-
remember)6.  The potential suspect denied involvement in the crime, and claimed that he and his 
son were walking his dog at a park near his home (located across town from the convenience 
store) at the time that the robbery took place.  At this point, participants were instructed to rate 
                                                          
6 To perform a manipulation check, a pilot study was conducted (n = 34).  Participants rated the 
level of difficulty associated with remembering alibi events that varied along two dimensions 
(delay: 1-day ago vs. 1-week ago vs. 1-month ago; novelty: novel vs. mundane).  A repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of delay on ratings of difficulty, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .38, F(2, 32) = 26.05, p < .001, multivariate ηp2 = .62.  Participants rated the event that 
occurred 1-month ago as being significantly more difficult to remember than the event that 
occurred 1-day ago (mean difference = 2.38, p < .001).  Therefore, the manipulation of perceived 
cognitive difficulty in the present study (i.e., 1-day delay vs. 1-month delay) was successful. 
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the likelihood that the suspect was guilty on a 10-point scale (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = 
Extremely Likely).   
On the next page, participants were informed that as the next step in their investigation, 
they interviewed the suspect’s son (the alibi corroborator).  Participants were randomly presented 
with an alibi corroborator who was either a 4-year-old, 8-year-old, or a 25-year-old.  In each 
condition, the corroborator claimed to have been in the park walking the dog with his father (the 
suspect).  Participants were instructed to rate the following on 10-point Likert scales: the 
likelihood that the suspect is guilty (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely), the 
believability of the alibi corroborator (1 = Extremely Unbelievable to 10 = Extremely 
Believable), the likelihood that the alibi corroborator is mistaken about being with the suspect (1 
= Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely), the likelihood that the alibi corroborator is being 
honest about being with the suspect (1 = Extremely Unlikely to 10 = Extremely Likely), and the 
overall credibility of the alibi corroborator (1 = Extremely Uncredible to 10 = Extremely 
Credible).  Participants were also asked to describe, in as much detail as possible, the reasoning 
for their ratings.  On the penultimate page, in order to determine if participants had paid 
attention, they were asked (in the form of multiple-choice questions) when the crime occurred, 
what the suspect claimed to be doing at the time of the crime, and the age of the alibi 
corroborator.  Participants were also asked if they were parents and if they had any experience 
working with children (yes/no).  The final page of the survey informed participants that the study 
had concluded, and thanked them for their participation.    
3.1.3 Procedure 
Undergraduate students (who were enrolled in either an introductory or an abnormal 
psychology class) registered to participate in the study through an online, research registration 
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system.  Upon arrival at the psychology laboratory, each participant was greeted and shown to a 
private cubicle containing a desktop computer.  Prior to beginning the online survey, participants 
were provided with verbal instructions on how to complete the study.  Before starting the survey, 
participants were presented with a page containing the informed consent form (by advancing 
beyond that page, consent was implied).  Upon completion of the survey, participants were 
presented with a debriefing page.  When participants finished the study, they were thanked for 
their participation and each student was awarded 0.5% bonus in his/her psychology course. 
3.1.4 Coding Open-Ended Responses 
 Each participant provided the reasoning for his/her ratings in an open-ended response.  
Through an iterative process, a coding guide was constructed by the first author who then coded 
all responses.  Four components were coded as present or absent: whether the participant 
mentioned (1) that the alibi event was inherently implausible (Plausibility), (2) that more 
information was necessary in order to make their decisions (More Information), (3) that the 
corroborator may have been influenced (Susceptibility to Influence), and (4) that the 
corroborator might have been an accomplice (Accomplice).  
3.1.5 Inter-Rater Reliability 
A research assistant also coded each participant’s open-ended response using the same 
coding guide.  The reliability of the coding was assessed using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) 
and percentage agreement (n = 127).  The Kappa and percentage agreement (in parentheses) for 
Plausibility was 0.89 (99%), for More Information was 0.54 (93%), for Susceptibility to 
Influence was 0.83 (91%), and for Accomplice was 0.79 (98%).  The average Kappa across all 
items was 0.76 (95%), indicating substantial agreement between coders (Landis & Koch, 1977).   
3.2 Results 
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Pre-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
 Immediately after viewing the crime scenario vignette, participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood of the suspect’s guilt (on a 10-point Likert scale).  Though all participants had been 
presented with identical information up to this point, in order to ensure that there were no group 
differences based on condition, a 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) × 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-
old vs. 25-year-old) between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the suspect was guilty.  The main effect of Age was 
not significant, F(2, 128) = 0.86, p = .427, ηp2 = .01, nor was the main effect of Delay, F(1, 128) 
= 2.65, p = .106, ηp2 = .02.  The Age × Delay interaction was also not significant, F(2, 128) = 
0.31, p = .731, ηp2 = .01. 
Pre-Alibi vs Post-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
 A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare participants’ pre-alibi and post-
alibi ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt.  There was a significant difference between 
pre-alibi and post-alibi guilt ratings, F(1, 133) = 19.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .13.  Thirteen percent of 
the variance in guilt ratings could be accounted for by whether the suspect’s guilt was rated 
before or after viewing the alibi.  Participants’ ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt 
were significantly higher before viewing the alibi (M = 5.78, SD = 1.68) than they were after 
viewing the alibi (M = 5.25, SD = 1.83).   
Post-Alibi Guilt Ratings 
A 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) × 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) 
between subjects ANCOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the 
suspect was guilty (with pre-alibi guilt ratings as a covariate).  There was a significant main 
effect of Age, F(2, 127) = 4.43, p = .014, ηp2 = .07.  Seven percent of the variance in guilt ratings 
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could be accounted for by the age of the alibi corroborator.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
guilt ratings were significantly lower when the corroborator was described as an 8-year-old (M = 
5.09, SD = 1.99) than when described as a 25-year-old (M = 5.51, SD = 1.63, d = .23, p = .004), 
no differences were observed between the 4-year-old (M = 5.15, SD = 1.89) and 25-year old or 
8-year-old conditions (ps > .05).   
There was also a main effect of Delay, F(1, 127) = 7.01, p = .009, ηp2 = .05.  Five percent 
of the variance in guilt ratings could be accounted for by the delay between the time of the crime 
and the time of questioning.  Participants rated the corroborator as significantly more likely to be 
guilty when the alibi event was described as taking place one month ago (M = 5.34, SD = 1.91) 
versus one day ago (M = 5.15, SD = 1.75, d = 0.10).  The Age × Delay interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 127) = 0.64, p = .531, ηp2 = .01.   
Alibi Believability 
A 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) × 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of alibi believability.  There 
was not a significant main effect of Age, F(2, 128) = 1.36, p = .259, ηp2 = .02, nor was there a 
significant main effect of Delay, F(1, 128) = 0.01, p = .927, ηp2 < .001.  The Age × Delay 
interaction was also not significant, F(2, 128) = 0.18, p = .838, ηp2 = .003.  
Ratings of the Likelihood of Corroborator Mistakenness 
A 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) x 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the alibi 
corroborator was mistaken about seeing the suspect.  There was a significant main effect of Age, 
F(2, 128) = 3.72, p = .027, ηp2 = .06.  Six percent of the variance in ratings of the likelihood that 
the corroborator was mistaken could be accounted for by the age of the alibi corroborator.  Post-
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hoc tests (with a Bonferroni correction) revealed that when the alibi corroborator was a 4-year-
old, participants rated the corroborator as more likely to be mistaken (M = 6.22, SD = 1.68) than 
when the corroborator was an 8-year-old (M = 5.13, SD = 2.25, d = .55, p = .026).  Ratings did 
not differ significantly between the 25-year-old condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.73) and the 8- and 
4-year-old conditions (ps > .05). There was not a significant main effect of Delay, F(1, 128) = 
2.09, p = .151, ηp2 = .02.  The Age × Delay interaction was also not significant, F(2, 128) = 1.12, 
p = .330, ηp2 = .02.   
Ratings of the Likelihood of Corroborator Honesty 
A 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) × 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the alibi 
corroborator was being honest about seeing the suspect.  There was not a significant main effect 
of Age, F(2, 128) = 2.19, p = .116, ηp2 = .03, nor was there a significant main effect of Delay, 
F(1, 128) = 0.10, p = .747, ηp2 = .001.  The Age × Delay interaction was also not significant, F(2, 
128) = 0.99, p = .374, ηp2 = .02.  
Ratings of the Overall Credibility of the Corroborator 
A 2 (Delay: 1-Day vs. 1-Month) × 3 (Age: 4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the overall credibility of the 
alibi corroborator.  There was a significant main effect of Age, F(2, 128) = 4.79, p = .010, ηp2 = 
.07.  Seven percent of the variance in overall credibility ratings could be accounted for by the age 
of the alibi corroborator.  Post-hoc tests (with a Bonferroni correction) revealed that when the 
alibi corroborator was an 8-year-old, participants rated the corroborator as significantly more 
credible (M = 6.07, SD = 1.63) than when the corroborator was a 4-year-old (M = 4.93, SD = 
1.71, d = .68, p = .004) but did not differ significantly from when the corroborator was a 25-year-
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old (M = 5.38, SD = 1.69, d = .42, p = .138).  Ratings did not differ significantly between the 4-
year-old and 25-year-old condition (p = .580).  There was also a significant main effect of Delay, 
F(1, 128) = 6.28, p = .013, ηp2 = .05.  Five percent of the variance in overall credibility ratings 
could be accounted for by the delay between the time of the crime and the time of questioning.  
Participants rated the corroborator as significantly more credible when the alibi event was 
described as taking place one day ago (M = 5.87, SD = 1.69) versus one month ago (M = 5.16, 
SD = 1.70).  The Age × Delay interaction was not significant, F(2, 128) = 1.98, p = .143, ηp2 = 
.03. 
Investigative Decision 
A chi-square test revealed that investigative decisions did not differ as a function of 
Corroborator Age, 2 (1, N = 134) = 1.31, p = .521.  The number of participants who chose to 
continue to pursue the individual as the prime suspect was similar for 4-year-old (25; 18.7%), 8-
year-old (23; 17.2%), and 25-year-old (28; 20.9%) corroborator conditions.  A chi-square test 
also revealed that investigative decisions did not differ as a function of Delay, 2 (1, N = 134) = 
0.04 (with Yates’ Continuity Correction), p = .853.  The number of participants who chose to 
continue to pursue the individual as the prime suspect was similar for the 1-Day delay (33; 
24.6%) and 1-Month delay (43; 32.1%) conditions.  Lastly, investigative decisions did not differ 
as a function of participants’ self-reported experience working with children, 2 (1, N = 134) = 
3.44 (with Yates’ Continuity Correction), p = .064.  The number of participants who chose to 
continue to pursue the individual as the prime suspect was similar for those who reported having 
experience working with children (42, 31.3%) and for those who reported having no experience 
working with children (34, 25.4%)  
Open-Ended Responses 
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Fifty-one participants (38.1%) mentioned that the corroborator may have been 
influenced, 7 participants (5.2%) mentioned that the corroborator may have also been involved in 
the offence (i.e., may have been an accomplice), 6 participants (4.5%) mentioned the need for 
more information in order to make their decision, and 5 participants (3.7%) mentioned that the 
alibi event sounded inherently implausible. 
3.3 Discussion 
 In the present study, I examined the extent to which alibi assessment outcomes differed 
as a function of the age of the corroborator (4-year-old vs. 8-year-old vs. 25-year-old) and the 
level of difficulty associated with remembering the alibi event (1-month delay vs. 1-day delay).  
Results indicated that alibi assessors viewed the 8-year-old as more compelling than the 4-year-
old and 25-year-old overall.  Participants rated the suspect as less likely to be guilty when 
described as an 8-year-old as compared to a 25-year-old, and rated the 8-year-old as a more 
credible corroborator overall (the difference in guilt ratings between the 8- and 4-year-old did not 
reach the conventional level of significance, nor did the credibility ratings between the 8- and 25-
year-old conditions, ps > .05).  Participants rated the 8-year-old corroborator as less likely to be 
mistaken than the 4-year-old, as well as marginally more likely to be honest than the 25-year-old.  
This pattern of results is consistent with the two-factor model of child witness credibility.  On the 
one hand, participants appeared to favour the cognitive ability of the 8-year-old relative to the 4-
year-old, and on the other hand, participants demonstrated a more favourable view of the honesty 
level of the 8-year-old as compared to the 25-year-old.   
 Consistent with my hypothesis, the current findings also revealed that participants were 
more skeptical of an alibi when it was provided after a delay of one month as compared to one 
day.  Participants provided significantly lower ratings of the overall credibility of the 
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corroborator and higher ratings of the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt in the 1-month delay 
condition, as compared to the 1-day delay condition.  These effects, however, were not reflected 
in participants’ investigative decisions about whether to continue to pursue the individual as the 
prime suspect or to begin looking for other potential suspects.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
participants did not rate the corroborator in the 1-month delay condition as being more likely to 
be mistaken than the corroborator in the 1-day delay condition.  This may have been due to the 
seeming lack of consequences of the delay.  That is, delay may only affect ratings of the 
likelihood of being mistaken insofar as delay is associated with other indicators of inaccuracy 
(e.g., inconsistencies, lack of detail) – the vignettes in the present study did not capture these 
features.  It is also possible that delay simply did not play a crucial role in many participants’ 
assessments, as evidenced by the large number of participants who were excluded on the basis of 
their inability to correctly report the delay at the end of the survey.   
As mentioned, those participants who did not pass the manipulation checks were 
removed prior to analysis.  The majority of exclusions were due to participants’ inability to 
report the delay at the end of the survey.  Indeed, many of these participants correctly reported 
what the suspect claimed to be doing, as well as the age of the corroborator, but nonetheless 
failed to report the delay correctly.  Together with the aforementioned null effect on ratings of 
the likelihood of the corroborator being mistaken, these observations may suggest either (1) that 
the current manipulation of delay was not strong enough (i.e., a wider contrast in delay 
conditions may have produced a more robust effect) or (2) that delay is not a critical aspect of the 
assessment process given the disproportionate exclusions due to participants’ misreporting of 
delay at the end of the survey.  These explanations may also account for the lack of significant 
interactions between age and delay (contrary to my hypothesis).  
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 There was again a notable proportion of participants who mentioned that the corroborator 
may have been influenced.  However, the number of participants who mentioned this as a 
possibility was much greater in Study 2 than in Study 1 (38.1% vs. 8.7%, respectively).  One 
possible explanation for the increased concern about the corroborator’s susceptibility to 
influence is that in Study 2 the corroborator was the suspect’s son (constant across all conditions) 
whereas in Study 1 the suspect-corroborator relationship varied quite widely across conditions 
(son vs. neighbour vs. stranger).  The closeness of the relationship in Study 2 may have 
contributed to participants’ increased overall concern about the father’s influence over his child.  
In line with this explanation, Eastwood et al. (2016) noted that their participants were 
particularly concerned about the potential for a young alibi corroborator to be influenced when 
the suspect and corroborator were related.  Thus, participants’ concern about the suspect’s 
influence on the corroborator may be more problematic when the corroborator is young and 
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
A Two-Factor Perspective 
 Previous inconsistencies in the literature regarding the impact of the age of an alibi 
corroborator provided the impetus for the current research.  To reiterate, some studies have found 
that child corroborators are more believable than are adults (Dahl & Price, 2012; Price & Dahl, 
2014), others have found that adult corroborators are more believable (Eastwood et al., 2016), 
and others have found no differences (Price & Dahl, 2017).  The current results are consistent 
with a two-factor interpretation of the perceived credibility of child alibi corroborators.  That is, 
the current results suggest that an 8-year-old corroborator, as compared to a 4- or 25-year-old, 
may approximate the ‘ideal’ balance between (1) perceptions of accuracy (i.e., more accurate 
than a younger child) and (2) perceptions of honesty (i.e., marginally more honest than an adult).  
This pattern of results fits with previous research that has found that witnesses around age 8 are 
perceived as highly credible (Nunez, Kehn & Wright, 2011; Wright, Hanoteau, Parkinson, & 
Tatham, 2010).  If this interpretation is correct, how can we reconcile the mixture of findings that 
exist regarding the effect of corroborator age?   
In the present research, for example, no age differences were found in Study 1, but were 
found in Study 2.  One possible explanation for this is the relative asymmetry between honesty 
and cognitive ability across studies.  In Study 1, the alibi event was brief and consisted only of 
visual contact (the corroborator saw the suspect) whereas in Study 2 the corroborator claimed to 
have been with the suspect.  The suspect-corroborator relationship in Study 1 also varied widely 
(between family member, neighbour, and stranger) whereas in Study 2 only a close-relationship 
corroborator was used (family member across conditions).  Overall, the cognitive ability of the 
corroborator may have been more salient in Study 1, whereas participants in Study 2 may have 
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been primed to consider the corroborator’s honesty.  I submit that previous inconsistencies with 
regards to the effect of corroborator age can be largely accounted for along similar lines.   
The perceptions of child- versus adult-corroborators depends largely on the balance 
between assessors’ perceptions of honesty and cognitive ability in any given case (as researchers 
have argued elsewhere, e.g., Goodman et al., 1989).  Of course, this should not be taken to 
suggest that the perceived honesty and cognitive ability of an alibi corroborator are the only 
relevant considerations for alibi assessors.  Certainly, other variables may interact with, or 
overshadow entirely, the effect of corroborator age (such as the effect of inconsistent testimony 
documented by Price & Dahl, 2017).  Furthermore, the age of the corroborator does not appear to 
be associated with decisions about whether to continue to pursue the individual as the primary 
suspect or to begin searching for other potential suspects.  To summarize, the two-factor model 
provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding child corroborator credibility 
assessments, but is less applicable to broader investigative decision-making (i.e., investigative 
decisions depend on a wide range of factors outside the purview of the two factor model).        
 Similar discrepancies between alibi-ratings and binary investigative decisions have been 
documented in previous research.  For example, Dahl and Price (2012) found significant effects 
of corroborator age on ratings of alibi credibility but no differences in participants’ decision 
about whether to arrest the suspect.  Eastwood, Lively, Snook, and Snow (2018) uncovered a 
similar mismatch between participants’ alibi ratings and their decisions about whether to 
continue to pursue the individual as their prime suspect or to begin searching for other potential 
suspects.  There are several possible explanations for the present, and past, discrepancies 
between alibi-ratings and binary investigative decision-making.  Perhaps the most obvious 
possibility is that the brief descriptions of the mock-crime scenario and the suspect’s alibi only 
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bear directly on ratings of alibi believability and ratings of the corroborator.  In contrast, 
meaningful decisions about the entirety of the investigation would depend on the provision of 
extensive case information – as many participants pointed out (e.g., “need more informationg 
[sic] to make the dicision [sic]”; “[t]here is not enough information”).  Another potential 
explanation is that (even if participants were provided with sufficient case information), they 
may be largely unaware of the factors that are influencing their decisions (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977).  Interestingly, Eastwood et al. (2016) found that law enforcement officers, as compared to 
student samples, were better able to identify those factors that influenced their alibi assessment 
decisions.  Thus, lay-participants’ lack of investigative experience may compound their lack of 
insight into what is driving their investigative decisions.  Whatever the reason for this 
discrepancy, it highlights an important disjunction between perceptions of the alibi itself and 
decisions about the investigation, and raises questions about the practical utility of measuring 
alibi ratings alone.  Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that alibi assessment outcomes are not 
necessarily commensurate with investigative outcomes.       
Considering the Possibility of a Third Factor 
It is noteworthy that 8-year-olds were viewed in such a favourable light considering the 
proportion of respondents who expressed concern about the susceptibility of the child to external 
influence (8.7% in Study 1, 38.1% in Study 2).  These findings fit with past research that has 
shown that adults are often concerned about the manipulability of child witnesses (Goodman et 
al., 1987) and the vulnerability of child alibi corroborators to the influence of others (Eastwood 
et al., 2016).  Perceptions of a child’s susceptibility to influence may be closely related to 
perceptions of their level of honesty and cognitive ability.  Nevertheless, these factors may be 
conceptually distinct.  For example, a child corroborator may be perceived as high in honesty but 
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also susceptible to being influenced by the suspect (e.g., if the child does not appear to 
understand that such behaviour constitutes dishonesty).  Likewise, a child may be perceived as 
high in cognitive ability (in the sense of being capable of deliberative reasoning, etc.,) but 
nonetheless highly susceptible to social and emotional pressures.  Indeed, such a dichotomy has 
been recognized within the adolescence research literature (e.g., ‘hot’ vs. ‘cold’ processes, 
Smith, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013).  Whether alibi assessors make such distinctions when 
determining the credibility of a corroborator is a question for future research.  Participants’ 
apparent preoccupation with the possibility that the corroborator could have been influenced 
suggests that this dimension (i.e., perceived susceptibility to external influence) may constitute 
an important third factor that is not captured fully by the honesty and cognitive components of 
the extant credibility model (a possibility also raised by Eastwood et al., 2016).    
 Another question raised by the perceived susceptibility of young witnesses to the 
influence of others is whether such a concern might have any objective justification.  Contrary to 
participants’ concerns about the suspect influencing the child corroborator, a number of studies 
have found that it is difficult for adults to coach young children to lie successfully (e.g., Vrij, 
Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2002; Warren, Bakhtiar, Mulrooney, Raynor, Dodd, & Peterson, 
2015; but see Talwar et al., 2006).  Vrij et al. (2002) noted that coaching was not successful with 
their youngest participants (5- and 6-year-olds), as these children appeared to have difficulty 
understanding the instructions.  Similarly, Tate, Warren, and Hess (1992, as cited by Warren et 
al., 2015) reported that only seven of 20 coached children (age range = 2.6–8 years) were able to 
lie throughout a conversation with another person.  More recently, Warren et al. (2015) reported 
that parents were unsuccessful in coaching their 5- to 7-year-old children to lie.  Although some 
studies have found that young children can indeed be coached to successfully tell believable lies 
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(e.g., 4- to 7-year-olds, Talwar et al., 2006), the aforementioned research suggests that this is not 
necessarily a straightforward task.  Thus, many participants’ belief in the current research that 
adult suspects can readily manipulate child corroborators – while not entirely without basis – 
may constitute an overestimation of children’s ability to successfully maintain a coached 
account.      
Implications 
It is worth reemphasizing here that the current line of inquiry is in its infancy.  The 
present work contributes to a small but emerging body of research examining perceptions of alibi 
corroborators in general and an even smaller body of work examining the effect of corroborator 
age in particular.  Clearly, further study is needed before alibi researchers can confidently deliver 
substantive policy recommendations or actionable guidelines for police practice.  With this 
caveat in mind, the present work does have a number of implications for the assessment of alibis 
in criminal justice proceedings.  In line with Dunning’s (1989) comments about the general 
usefulness of child credibility research, attorneys may wish to use the current findings to either 
add or detract from the perceived credibility of child witnesses in any given case.  For example, 
attorneys may wish to maximize or minimize the credibility of a child corroborator by 
emphasizing either honesty or cognitive ability, respectively.  
The current findings also help to highlight some important gaps between common-
knowledge and scientific-knowledge such that investigators and jurors may benefit from 
additional instructions and/or expert testimony on matters of child alibi testimony.  In addition to 
the aforementioned observation that participants may have an exaggerated perception of the 
manipulability of young children, participants also rated the 4-year-old corroborator as more 
likely to be mistaken than the 8-year-old corroborator.  Research has shown, however, that 
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children as young as 4-years-old can provide substantive and forensically useful information in 
response to free-recall prompts (Lamb et al., 2003) and although younger children recount their 
experiences with greater brevity than that of older children (e.g., Ornstein et al., 1992), they are 
not necessarily less accurate (e.g., Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac, 1979).  While previous 
research by Quas, Thompson, and Clarke-Stewart (2005) reported that a majority (66%) of their 
participants agreed that children have sufficient memory to be reliable witnesses in court, the 
current findings suggest that the documented ability of young witnesses to provide reliable 
information is largely beyond the ken of the average participant.  Therefore, expert testimony 
may be warranted in cases involving young alibi corroborators in order to safeguard against the 
damaging effects (e.g., undue skepticism and misattribution of guilt) that may arise due to 
assessors’ inaccurate beliefs about young witnesses. 
In addition to the practical utility of correcting alibi assessors’ inaccurate beliefs about 
child corroborators, the current research can also inform investigative procedures.  After a longer 
delay (one month), mock investigators in Study 2 rated the corroborator as less credible overall 
and the suspect as more likely to be guilty than when the alibi was provided after a shorter delay 
(one day).  These findings comport with previous research by Dysart and Strange (2012) 
regarding the effect of the passage of time on alibi believability, and are in line with the authors’ 
suggestion that alibi evidence (both person and physical) should be investigated as soon as 
possible after receiving the suspect’s initial alibi statement.  This seemingly straightforward 
recommendation, however, would likely require patrol officers to receive additional training in 
investigative techniques in order to follow-up on alibi statements, as this is ordinarily the 
responsibility of detectives (rather than patrol officers) (Dysart & Strange, 2012).  At the very 
least, investigators should be made aware of the importance of completing timely investigations 
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of alibi statements and informed of the potential for prolonged delays to contribute to 
(mis)perceptions of the veracity of alibi evidence.   
Limitations 
A number of important limitations must be highlighted.  Perhaps the most obvious but by 
no means unique limitation of the present work was the low level of ecological validity and 
mundane realism.  Both studies used a mock-investigator paradigm.  The decisions and 
perceptions of real investigators, of course, were not examined.  Under further scrutiny, however, 
this limitation may not be of tremendous practical consequence.  For example, Eastwood et al. 
(2016) found that the alibi assessment processes of police officers, law enforcement students, 
and university students were generally similar overall.  Such similarities have been documented 
in other domains as well (e.g., both students and police rely on non-diagnostic cues when 
detecting deception; Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016).  In other words, if police 
officers had been included in the current research, there is good reason to believe that the broad 
pattern of results would have ultimately remained the same. 
Beyond simply not being experienced investigators, participants in both studies made 
legally relevant decisions but were presented only with written descriptions (not video-
recordings), and were unlikely to be emotionally invested in the case or concerned about the 
consequences of their decisions.  Nor were these decisions made in consultation with other actors 
within the legal system (i.e., participants did not interact with real police officers, witnesses, 
etc.).  It is worth noting, however, that previous research has uncovered few differences between 
mock-jurors’ perceptions based on written transcripts versus video-recorded testimony (e.g., 
Goodman et al., 1987).  Furthermore, the use of written transcripts affords a level of control that 
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is difficult to acquire with naturalistic video-recordings (i.e., video-recordings introduce 
extraneous variables such as attractiveness and demeanor).   
Another limitation, and one that is also not unique to the present research, is that the 
generalizability of the current findings is tightly constrained.  That is, one cannot extend the 
current findings beyond the specific age categories that were used (i.e., 4-year-old, 8-year-old, 
and 25-year-old) to make conclusions about other age groups.  Further research is needed to 
examine additional ages and to examine adolescent corroborators.  Lastly, participants were not 
informed of the suspect’s age but were informed of the corroborator’s age.  This may have led 
participants to infer the suspect’s age based on the age of the corroborator – particularly when 
the suspect was described as the corroborator’s father.  Participants may be more prone to 
believe an older suspect over a younger suspect, or vice versa.  Indeed, pilot data suggested that 
the perceived likelihood of engaging in an armed robbery (the crime type used in both studies) 
varied as a function of the suspect’s age.  However, comments about the suspect’s age seldom 
appeared in participants’ open-ended responses concerning the reasoning for their ratings.  
Nevertheless, further research is needed to examine the role of the suspect’s age (actual or 
perceived) on alibi assessment outcomes. 
Conclusion 
The present findings comport with past studies of the suspect-corroborator relationship – 
close-relationship corroborators in the present research were viewed with greater skepticism than 
more distantly related corroborators.  The present research also helps to shed light on some 
existing inconsistencies in the literature, and the data appear consistent with a two-factor model 
of child witness credibility.  Mock investigators’ rated an 8-year-old corroborator as more 
credible than a 4-year-old corroborator and (marginally) more credible than a 25-year-old 
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corroborator.  Further, participants rated the suspect as less likely to be guilty when an 8-year-
old, as opposed to a 25-year-old, corroborated his alibi.  The 8-year-old child was rated as less 
likely to be mistaken than the 4-year-old, and (marginally) more likely to be honest than the 25-
year-old.  Thus, children around age 8 may have the ‘upper hand’ on dimensions of honesty and 
accuracy.  Overall, the results suggest that older children (around age 8) may approximate the 
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Appendix A – Study 1 Survey Materials 
Demographics 
Age: __________ 
Gender: Male____ Female____ Other_____ 
Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:  
 White  




Year of study:  
 First  
 Second  
 Third  
 Fourth  
 Fifth or more 
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Case Details  
[Page 1] 
In this study, you will be playing the role of a police detective investigating an armed robbery case. The 
robbery took place at a local convenience store. After an initial investigation, the police have identified a 
potential suspect. He drives the same make and model of car that was identified by an eyewitness as 
fleeing the scene, and although a ski mask was worn during the crime the suspect matches the general 
physical description given by the store clerk. 
When interviewed, the potential suspect claimed to have no involvement in the crime, and reported that 
he was walking his dog in the park next to his home during the time the crime took place.  
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[Page 2] 
You were able to identify another individual who claims they can verify the suspect’s account. He is an 
[8-year-old vs. 25-year-old] male who [has no direct relationship with the suspect vs. is the suspect’s 
neighbour vs. is the suspect’s son]. He reported that he was playing baseball in the park with his friends 
during the evening in question. He said that he saw [the suspect vs. his neighbour vs. his father] 
walking his dog past the baseball diamond at the time the crime took place. This matches the suspect’s 
account of being in the park while the crime took place. 
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How likely do you think it is that the alibi corroborator is mistaken about seeing the suspect in the park 
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How likely do you think it is that the alibi corroborator is honest about seeing the suspect in the park 
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Please describe, in as much detail as possible, the reasoning for your decisions: 
________________________________________________________________... 
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Appendix B – Study 2 Survey Materials 
Demographics 
Age: __________ 
Gender: Male____ Female____ Other_____ 
Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:  
 White  




 Latin American 
 Arab 
 Southeast Asian (e.g. Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Thai etc.) 
 West Asian (e.g. Iranian, Afghan etc.) 
 Korean 
 Japanese 
 Other (please specify): ________ 
Year of study:  
 First  
 Second  
 Third  
 Fourth  

















In this study, you will be playing the role of a police detective investigating an armed robbery case. The 
robbery took place at 7:00 pm [yesterday evening vs. one month ago] at a local convenience store. After 
an initial investigation, the police were able to identify a potential suspect. He drives the same make and 
model of car that was identified by an eyewitness as fleeing the scene, and although a ski mask was worn 
during the crime, the suspect matches the general physical description given by the store clerk. 
When interviewed, the potential suspect claimed to have no involvement in the crime. He reported that he 
and his son were walking his dog in the park close to his home, which is across town from the store, 
during the time that the crime took place.  
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As the next step in your investigation, you interview the suspect’s son. He is [4 vs. 8 vs. 25] years old. 
When asked about his whereabouts around 7:00 pm [yesterday vs. one month ago], the son says that he 
was in the park with his dad walking the dog. This matches the suspect’s account of being in the park 
while the crime took place. 
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How likely do you think it is that the alibi corroborator is mistaken about being with the suspect in the 
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How likely do you think it is that the alibi corroborator is being honest about being with the suspect at the 
park at the time that the crime took place? 
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Please describe, in as much detail as possible, the reasoning for your ratings: 
________________________________________________________________... 
 
What decision would you make regarding the suspect at this point in the investigation? 
 Continue to pursue him as your prime suspect 
 Begin to search for other potential suspects 
 
Based on the scenario you just read, when did the crime occur? 
 Yesterday 
 One week ago 
 Two weeks ago 
 One month ago 
 
Based on the scenario you just read, what did the suspect claim to be doing at the time that the crime took 
place? 
 Golfing 
 Walking his dog at the park 
 Working out at the gym 
 Watching TV at home 
 
Are you a parent? 
 Yes 
 No 
Do you have any past experience working with children? 
 Yes (Please specify) _________ 
 No 
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Appendix C – Study 1 Exclusion Criteria 
1. Data were excluded from the analysis if a participant’s open-ended response…: 
a) Was limited to non-alphabetic characters (e.g., “?”, “…”, etc.),  
b) was limited to “N/A”, 
c) or was deemed by independent coders as incoherent and/or inappropriate (e.g., “Good”, 
“muy bueno”, “5”, etc.) 
 
2. Data were excluded from the analysis if a participant’s self-reported age was below 18 
years (except in the case of mature minors – e.g., a 17-year-old undergraduate student) 
 
